R. (on the application of Noorkoiv) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) - The Case of the Parole Delay

R. (on the application of Noorkoiv) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2)
[2002] H.R.L.R. 36
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

Brief Summary:

The appellant is a repeat offender who was given an automatic life sentence, consisting of a mandatory term in prison ("a tarriff"), after which the he was eligible for parole.  The parole board intentionally scheduled his first parole hearing for two months after his tariff expired.  The court held that this unnecessary delay violated the appellant's rights under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  The parole board was required to consider these cases before the expiry of the prisoner’s tariff rather than waiting until the tariff period had expired. 

 

The Facts:

The appellant was convicted of two offences in 1998 and given an automatic life sentence pursuant to section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.   His tariff period, the mandatory part of his sentence, was fixed by the court at 30 months and expired on April 21, 2001. His first hearing before the Parole Board to determine whether he should continue to be detained under sections 28(5) and 28(6) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was scheduled to take place over the period of June 20 to 21, 2001. The appellant issued proceedings in March 2001 seeking to have the hearing date brought forward. The appellant alleged that the delay of two months before the Parole Board determined the lawfulness of his detention was in breach of Articles 5(1) and 5(4) of the ECHR .

The Holding:

The Court held that the period of detention between the expiry of the appellant's tariff period and the decision of the Parole Board was compatible with Article 5(1) because there was a sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the deprivation of liberty.  However, given the imperative need to release from prison any post-tariff prisoner who no longer remained a danger, any system tending to delay such release required the most compelling justification.  The government's argument that the delay was caused by a lack of resources was not a valid excuse under Article 5(4) ("Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.").  Finally, the delay in the appellant's case violated his rights under Article 5(4) because the delay was automatic without any consideration of the unique features of the appellant's case and the appellant was subjected to the full penal regime (i.e., not treated as a remand prisoner) while he waited.

Villain?

 

Although a repeat offender, the appellant did not appear to be a violent criminal and was only requesting a parole hearing before his mandatory sentence expired.  Not a villain.