Andrews v. Reading BC: The Case of the Noisy Road

Andrews v. Reading BC

[2004] EWHC 970 (Admin)

Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

29 April 2004

 

NOTE: An Excellent Summary of this case can be found at: http://www.1cor.com/1315/?form_1155.replyids=362

 

Brief Summary:

The claimant sued his local authority under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights because his local authority had changed the nearby highways so that the claimant was subjected to excess traffic noise outside of his house.  Under current regulations, he could receive no recompense.  The claimant sought £4,200 to compensate him for his noise mitigation efforts and was awarded £2000 by the court for the inconvenience he suffered and because the defendant local council had failed to take any steps to mitigate the noise damage when it altered the highways.

 

The Facts:

The claimant had spent £4,200 insulating his home in order to mitigate excessive traffic noise created by a traffic regulation order made by the local Council. If the Regulations applied, there would have been a discretion to make a grant for noise insulation provided that the increase caused by the relevant highway alteration made an effective contribution to the existing noise level of at least 1dB(A) and that that level was at least 68dB(A) averaged over a period between 6am and midnight on a normal working day. A, who was a retired engineer, had carried out measurements which he contended to demonstrate an average increase of 3.17dB(A) over the 6am to midnight period and that the relevant level was 71.78dB(A). A's figures showed that even at night between 9pm and 10pm the levels reached 69dB(A). Although A was interested only in obtaining the £4,200 he had to pay for noise  insulation, for the Reading local authority there was the prospect that the cost of traffic regulation orders would escalate if the claim was successful. 

The claimant was not entitled to a grant under the Noise Insulation Regulations 1975 and he was unsuccessful in his proceedings for damages to defray his expenses before the county court judge. Before the Divisional Court, the claimant maintained his argument that the traffic regulation order interfered with his rights under the  Article 8(1) of the Convention (right to a private life) and that the absence of any possibility of compensation made that interference disproportionate. The Reading local authority argued that it was clear that the traffic order was justified because that the order's benefits outweighed the adverse impact on the claimant; and that the Regulations showed that Parliament had considered the scope of grant schemes in relation to road traffic noise and had not extended it to the sort of order with which claimant's claim was concerned.

The Holding:

 

The claimant was successful because the noise interfered with the claimant's Article 8 rights.  Moreover, the defendant had failed to take or to consider taking any steps to mitigate the extra noise created by the scheme; it also refused to pay any compensation for the interference, nor did it consider doing so. Hence there was no justification for this interference. The appropriate level of damages was £2,000. This represented (a) the sum which it would have been reasonable for the defendant to offer in the light of the claimant's complaints plus (b) a sum to reflect the unreasonable way in which claimant's requests were responded to.

 

Villain? 

 

The claimant just wanted recompense for the noise insulation he had to pay for when the Council created a busier road outside his house.  Not a villain.

Marlon Miller v. Director of Public Prosecutions: The Case of the Speedy Driver and the Slow Warrant

Marlon Miller v. Director of Public Prosecutions

[2004] EWHC 595 (Admin)

High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division Administrative Court

25 March 2004

 

Brief Summary:

The applicant was given three speeding tickets in February 1999 and a warrant was issued for him to attend a hearing to potentially have his license revoked.  The warrant was not executed for two years and the applicant argued that the delay violated his right to a speedy trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The High Court agreed and reduced his license disqualification period from 12 to 5 months.

 

The Facts:

The applicant was given three speeding tickets in February 1999.  The applicant pled guilty to these offenses by post and did not attend the initial hearing on 6 May 1999.  The justices issued a warrant for the applicant to force him to attend the next hearing since they were considering taking away his driving license.  It was illegal for the court to issue this warrant, however, since the court did not first give written notice to the applicant.  The warrant was not executed for two years due to police error, which meant that the applicant was first telephoned by the police in May 2001 and informed there was a warrant for his arrest.  At the 14 May 2001 hearing, the applicant complained of the delay and the case was adjourned and delayed several times for several different reasons until 2 August 2001.

The appellant contended that the delay in the disposal of the case was an infringement of Article 6 and that in those circumstances he should be permitted to change his plea to not guilty and to have the case against him dismissed for breach of the Convention right as to a trial within a reasonable time. The justices rejected those arguments, holding that whilst the delay was excessive for a case of this type it did not warrant either a finding of abuse of process or dismissal of the charges on the grounds of an infringement of Article 6.

On 6 September the justices dealt with all outstanding matters. As to sentence, they fined the appellant £150 in respect of each offence. His licence was endorsed with 4 penalty points in respect of each offence. It was already subject to two endorsements for speeding offences in July 2000. The total number of penalty points was such that the justices disqualified him for 12 months under the totting up provisions of s.35 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

The applicant completed six months of his suspension until the suspension was suspended by the appeals court.  The case eventually made it to the High Court.

The Holding:

 

The appellant's case in brief is that there was a breach of Article 6 since, in relation to issues as simple as those raised by the three informations against the appellant, a delay of over 2 years in the determination of the case against him was unreasonable. No complaint is made about the delay from the laying of the information to the return date on the summonses. It is said that a reasonable period from then until the sentencing hearing would have been about 1 month. The whole of the additional time that the claimant had to wait until sentencing was unreasonable delay. That includes the period of almost 2 years until the matter came back before the court in May 2001, none of which was the fault of the appellant. It also includes the period of over 3 months from then until the final hearing on 6 September 2001, which again was not the fault of the appellant.

The respondent conceded that there was an unreasonable delay and the High Court agreed: “a total period of over 2 years in the magistrates' court and a further year or so in time wasted over the appeal, in such a simple case with guilty pleas, was excessive and in breach of Article 6.”  As a result, the High Court reduced the disqualification to five months to ensure that the applicant faced no more days of driving disqualification.

 

Villain? 

 

Speeding tickets do not a villain make. 

R. (On the Application of Middleton) v. HM Coroner for Western Somerset: The Case of Public Neglect

R. (On the Application of Middleton) v. HM Coroner for Western Somerset

[2004] UKHL 10

11 March 2004

House of Lords

Brief Summary:

The applicant was the mother of a prisoner who committed suicide while in prison for murder.  The applicant sought to make public the note from the jury at the inquest that said that the prison had been negligent in failing to prevent the suicide.  The House of Lords held that the current regime was in violation of Article 2 of the ECHR and that the Coroners Act 1988 and Coroners Rules should be interpreted broadly to allow the coroner to report on all material issues that led to the victim's death, including prison neglect.

The Facts:

The applicant's son committed suicide in January 1999 whilst in prison for murder. He had been in custody since his conviction at the age of 14 for the murder of his 18-month-old niece, and was aged 30 when he died. He had a history of self-harm and was receiving medication for depression at the time of his death.

The verdict reached at a first coroner's inquest was quashed for want of sufficient enquiry and a second inquest was held in October 2002. At the end of the evidence the coroner ruled that the issue of “neglect” should not be left to the jury. However, he told the jury that, if they wished, they could give him a note regarding any specific areas of evidence, which he would consider in relation to his power under r.43 of the Coroners Rules 1984 (power to report to the relevant authority in order to prevent recurrence of similar fatalities). The jury returned a verdict that the deceased had taken his own life when the balance of his mind was disturbed, and stated in a note to the coroner that the Prison Service had failed in its duty of care for the deceased. The coroner declined the family's request to append the jury's note to the inquisition, but wrote to the Chief Inspector of Prisons drawing attention to the contents of the note.

In her application for judicial review, the applicant sought an order that the findings set out in the jury's note be publicly recorded, so that there should be a formal public determination of the Prison Service's responsibility for her son's death. The Judge declined the order on the basis that the coroner had acted unlawfully in suggesting production of the note, but declared that, due to the unavailability of a verdict of neglect, the inquest was inadequate to meet the procedural obligation in Art.2 ECHR. On appeal by the Secretary of  State, the Court of Appeal declared that where a coroner knew that an inquest was the way in which the state's Art.2 obligation was to be fulfilled, and a finding of neglect could reduce the risk of repetition of the circumstances leading to the death in question, it was necessary to construe r.42 of the Coroners Rules 1984 as allowing a finding of neglect, providing no individual was named therein. The Secretary of State appealed to their Lordships' House, seeking to have the Court of Appeal's declaration set aside.

The Holding:

According to the Law Lords, the European Court of Human Rights had interpreted Art.2 of the ECHR as imposing on member states substantive obligations not to take life without justification and also to establish a framework of laws, precautions, procedures and means of enforcement which would, to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, protect life. It had also interpreted Art.2 as imposing on member states a procedural obligation to initiate an effective public investigation by an independent official body into any death occurring in circumstances in which it appeared that one or other of the foregoing substantive obligations had been, or may have been, violated and it appeared that agents of the state were, or may have been, in some way implicated.

Further, in order to meet the procedural requirement of Art.2 an inquest ought ordinarily to culminate in an expression, however, brief, of the jury's conclusion on the disputed factual issues at the heart of the case. This requirement applied, not only to cases involving the use of lethal force by agents of the state, but also to a broader category of cases such as cases of negligence. The Law Lords noted that a verdict of an inquest jury which did not express the jury's conclusion on a major issue canvassed in the evidence at the inquest (such as whether the prison had been negligent) could not satisfy or meet the expectations of the deceased's family or next-of-kin. Secondly, it would not promote the objects of the ECHR if domestic law were to distinguish between cases where an agent of the state may have used lethal force without justification and cases in which a defective system operated by the state may have failed to afford adequate protection to human life.

Accordingly, the current regime did not meet the requirements of Art. 2 in some cases, such as the present case.  The current regime could be revised so as to meet these requirements by interpreting “how” in s.11(5)(b)(ii) of the Coroners Act 1988 and r.36(1)(b) of the Coroners Rules 1984  as meaning not simply “by what means” but “by what means and in what circumstances.” In cases where this called for a change of approach it was for the coroner, in the exercise of his discretion, to decide how best, in the particular case, to elicit the jury's conclusion on the central issue or issues and his decision should not be disturbed by the courts unless strong grounds were shown.

Villain? 

The victim was a convicted murderer but his mother was merely trying to publicize the neglect in the prison system that led to his suicide.  A harder case than Sacker but still, not a villain.